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Introduction
When Sandy Ogburn. Assistant to the
General Manager at Triangle Transit Authority
(TTA). first arrived in the North Carolina
Research Triangle region from Philadelphia, she
planned to stay only two years. However,
because of "the slower pace of life, all the
amenities in the region, and the beautiful blue
color of the sky." she and her family have made
the Triangle home for over 25 years. During that
time. Ms. Ogburn has been an active member of
the Triangle community, serving as a member of
the Durham City Council, as chair of the
Durham-Chapel Hill-Carrboro Metropolitan
Planning Organization (DCHC MPO)
Transportation Advisory Committee, and as chair
of the TTA Board of Directors.
Unfortunately, recent trends may threaten
the high quality of life that has attracted people,
like Ogburn. and businesses to the Triangle in the
past. Traffic congestion and air pollution
problems that have plagued other fast-growing
metropolitan areas have come to the Triangle.
According to the North Carolina Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (NC
DENR). the Research Triangle region
experienced eight Code Red ("unhealthy") and
twenty-three Code Orange ("unhealthy for
sensitive groups") ozone days in 1 999 (NC
DENR 2000). Automobile emissions are a major
source of this pollution, and an inefficient
regional transportation system contributes to the
emissions problem by exacerbating traffic
congestion. Traffic volumes on Interstate 40 at
the Wake-Durham county line increased from
about 7 1 .000 vehicles per day in 1 990 to over
1 1 ,000 vehicles per day by 1 995 (Eisenstadt and
Hoar 1995). Commuters often spend an hour
traversing the 10-mile stretch of Interstate 40
between Research Triangle Park and Raleigh.
The region's congestion problem has increasingly
drawn press coverage, with helicopter traffic
reports and live views from traffic cameras
broadcast each night on the local news.
Ms. Ogburn attributes much of the blame for
the Triangle's worsening congestion to a lack of
coordination between the region's land use and
transportation decision-makers. She stated in a
recent interview, "We [in the Triangle region] are
quickly going the way ofmany large metropolitan
areas by not acting regionally. Air pollution does
not stop at the county line. It's not a Durham
problem. It's not a Raleigh problem. It's our
problem as a region." She suggests also that the
economic viability ofthe Triangle, which is
dependent on the region's quality of life, will be
damaged when agencies and municipalities act
individually. Over the past few years, businesses
have begun to question moving to and staying in
the Triangle because their employees are
frustrated with air pollution and traffic congestion
problems. Ogburn warns. "Ultimately, without
regional coordination, our quality of life will be
diminished, and the Triangle will become a less
desirable place to live. People will search for
greener pastures— literally" (Ogburn 2000).
Air pollution and traffic congestion are one
result of land use and transportation decisions
that are made by individual municipalities, such
as Raleigh, Durham. Chapel Hill, and Cary,
without consideration of their effects on the
region as a whole. These four cities and nearby
communities compose the Triangle region of
North Carolina (Figure 1 ). The major
employment center of the region. Research
Triangle Park, and the Raleigh-Durham
International Airport are located in the center of
the "triangle." Malls, sporting events and most
jobs are within an hour's drive of almost any
household in the region. Because Triangle
residents travel between all communities in the
region to take advantage of social, cultural,
employment, and other resources, it makes sense
to use regional approaches to planning and share
the costs and benefits of development.
Figure 1: Regional Traffic Congestion
Source: WML
Purpose and Methodology
This paper argues that the lack of
coordination between localities with land use
decision-making authority and regional agencies
with transportation decision-making power
causes the Triangle region to develop
unsustainable land use patterns and
transportation systems. The purpose of this
paper is to:
suggest general keys to success for
cooperative regional governance
structures;
evaluate the effectiveness and feasibility
ofalternative institutional frameworks for
regional coordination in comparison to the
current land use and transportation
decision-making structures in the
Triangle; and
recommend five institutional changes that
could be adopted separately or in
combination to improve regional
coordination in the Triangle region.
Two sources of opinion, responses to a brief
questionnaire from five regional agencies located
in different parts of the country (Alabama,
California, Illinois/Iowa. North Carolina, and
Oregon) and academic literature on inter-
jurisdictional cooperation, suggest keys to
success and guide the evaluation and
recommendations.
Taking a Regional View
Proponents of regional coordination of land
use and transportation development cite
numerous planning issues that are the result of
the balkanization of local governments within a
region and a lack of concern about the impacts
ofdevelopment and regulation policies on other
jurisdictions (MSRC 1993;Chapralis 1994;
Pincetl 1994; Baldassare, et al. 1996; Leo, et al.
1998; Rusk 2000). Research has identified
several problems that relate specifically to
coordinating land use and transportation between
jurisdictions:
Inefficient regional development
patterns determined by land use choices
made at the local level tend not to support
higher densities in locations that will
optimize the efficiency of regional
transportation systems (Porter 1997:
Rusk 2000).
Inefficient transportation system
leading to poor connectivity between
roads and transit systems across
jurisdictional boundaries. Less direct
transit routes result in fewer
transportation mode choices for residents.
and awkward road connections result in
more air pollution and time spent in traffic
(Porter 1994; Baldassare. et al. 1996).
Individual local development choices
result in greater dispersion ofjobs
throughout a region. Low-skilled jobs
become less accessible to workers with
little money to spend on transportation
(Pincetl 1994; Rusk 2000).
Interstates and other freeways make
"greenfield" sites at the edge of
metropolitan areas accessible and
attractive for development. As a result,
central city lots and buildings that are
served by roads, sewer, utilities, schools,
and other services are abandoned for
these new sites that are not served by
infrastructure and public services and
may be sensitive environmental areas or
productive farmland (Porter 1997).
Critics of regional cooperation state that
there is a lack of concrete evidence linking
political fragmentation to specific problems.
Detractors also point out that larger governments
are inefficient, and that small local governments
provide citizens with increased choice, more
responsiveness and a greater chance for public
input in land use and transportation decisions
(Pincetl 1994; Baldassare. etal. 1996; Porter
1997).
Movement Towards Regional Strategies in
the Triangle
Recent initiatives show that there is
receptiveness towards using regional strategies
to coordinate land use and transportation
decisions in the Triangle. In 1972. the Triangle J
Council ofGovernments (Triangle J COG), one
of 1 8 North Carolina COGs. was formed as a
voluntary organization of municipal and county
governments from the six counties of the region
(Figure 2). The Greater Triangle Regional
Council (GTRC), a coalition ofdevelopers,
environmentalists, fanners, neighborhood
activists, business owners, university
representatives, and chamber of commerce
members from the region, was formed in 1993 to
provide a private perspective on the region's
problems (Warrick 1993). GTRC helped to
develop a series of "smart growth" principles for
the Triangle region (Leavenworth 1999). The
principles include:
Design new and preserve existing
neighborhoods and communities to foster
walkability. safety and a sense of place;
Promote different mixed-use centers of
various scales for each citv, town and
crossroads in the Triangle to serve as
centers of civic, social, cultural, and
economic life, and as transportation hubs;
Create a seamless, regional, multi-modal
transportation system which interlinks
new and existing residential, employment,
commercial, and recreational areas;
Promote development patterns and
designs that take advantage of and
support regional and neighborhood
transportation systems;
Preserve more natural areas and open
space and provide for their
interconnection at local and regional
levels; and
Coordinate land use development and
transportation infrastructure and services
to help achieve each of these principles.
There has also been state support for linking
land use and transportation at the regional level.
The North Carolina Commission to Address
Smart Growth. Growth Management, and
Development Issues ("Smart Growth
Commission") is developing recommendations
that it will present to the state legislature in
January 2001 (Godschalk 2000). One of the
recommendations the Smart Growth Commission
is considering is for the state to allow localities to
voluntarily form regional governments. Under
this arrangement, the voluntary regional
governments will adopt regional smart growth
plans, and if members adopt local smart growth
plans consistent with the regional plan, the
localities in the region could have access to a
"smart growth toolbox" (Stradling 2000). This
would allow Triangle communities to use a series
of state supported smart growth policies, such as
transfer of development rights or impact fees on
new development, without a formal act from the
state legislature. Regions that require
consistency with a regional smart growth plan
would also be eligible for state funded incentives
to implement regional planning efforts. This type
of initiative could result in a regional forum to
unite land use and transportation development
decisions in the Triangle.
Keys to Success for Regional Coordination
of Land Use and Transportation
Modeling regional strategies after successful
regional initiatives in other parts of the country
could help ensure the success of regional
initiatives in the Triangle. Responses from the
five regional agencies and other academic
research suggest there are several critical
elements to creating a regional institutional
structure that fosters integrative decision-making
(Table 1 ). These elements fall under two main
evaluative criteria, feasibility and effectiveness.
A regional structure's effectiveness is the extent
to which the organization is able to get results by
implementing land use and transportation
development tools and decisions. A regional
structure'sfeasibility is the degree of difficulty
in maintaining the necessary institutional
arrangements from political, legal and technical
perspectives. Equity, or the ability of agencies to
include all regional stakeholders in land use and
transportation decisions, is an important
component within this category. Regional
institutions must be equitable in order to maintain
the support of grassroots and other public
interest groups.
The literature shows that regional
governments are most effective when agencies:
Integrate a number of tools to create a
comprehensive regional development
program (Lassar 1991: Leo. et ah 1998):
Establish concrete, understandable,
common goals for communities within the
region (Porter 1997):
^S^s-^WZ
Triangle J Council ofGovernments
(Chatham. Durham. Johnston. Lee.
Orange and Wake Counties)
Figure 2: North Carolina Councils ofGovernment
Source: Land ofSky Regional Council, S'C Councils
ofGovernment
* Establish joint advisory committees to
address land use and transportation
issues:
Promote active communication and
collaboration between jurisdictions: and
Emphasize implementation of plans and
programs.
It also shows that regional initiatives are
most feasible when agencies:
Solicit public involvement in the land use
and transportation process (Carlson and
King 1998):
Take a bottom-up approach to developing
regional plans, work w ith local
jurisdictions as much as possible, and
allow local implementation of regional
strategies (Baldassare. et al. 1996):
Understand traditional institutional
barriers to regional coordination, such as
local home rule authority ( Porter 1 997):
Obtain state support for regional
cooperation (Porter 1997: Carlson and
King 1998): and
Define a clear objective (such as
reduction of regional air pollution,
reduction in regional traffic congestion, or
better management of regional
infrastructure) that requires regional
coordination to be achieved (Chapralis
1 994: Porter 1997).
Current Institutional Arrangements
The Triangle's current institutional structure
has many of the attributes that should lead to
successful regional coordination as mentioned
above. Yet. an alternative institutional
arrangement may be able to achieve greater
effectiveness while maintaining feasibility.
Established Institutional Arrangements
The initiatives of the GTRC and other
proponents of regional cooperation have
promoted this concept within the Triangle's
established institutional framework. However.
these initiatives mav not be successful if the
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current power structure for land use and
transportation decisions remains in place.
Currently, four government agencies
influence regional transportation and land use
planning in the Triangle. Triangle J COG plays a
role in facilitating agreements between localities,
providing data and suggesting principles for land
use and transportation development. The region
has two separate Metropolitan Planning
Organizations, the Capital Area MPO
(CAMPO), which represents areas around
Raleigh, and the Durham-Chapel Hill-Carrboro
MPO (DCHC MPO). Both MPOs have the
power to develop transportation implementation
programs and to distribute state and federal
transportation funds. Finally, the Triangle Transit
Authority has been given the responsibility of
planning and operating a regional transit system.
Despite the existence of these regional
governments, current institutional arrangements
dictate that land use planning and development
decisions remain firmly within the administrative
purview of municipal and county government.
Local governments have the power to:
Develop comprehensive land use plans;
Enact zoning ordinances/establish zoning
districts:
Raise taxes and acquire land; and
Create subdivision and transit-oriented
development guidelines.
In contrast, regional governments play more
of an advisory or clearinghouse role without a
great deal of decision-making power. For
example. TTA has limited power to acquire land
within and around the right-of-way of its future
regional rail corridor. TTA has encouraged local
municipalities to zone a high-density mix of land
uses in areas near future rail stations in its
Station Area Development Guidelines (TTA
1998), yet it can do little if municipalities such as
Cary or Chapel Hill decide to zone areas near
future stations as low-density residential. Hence,
local land use decisions will have a significant
impact on the efficiency of the future rail system
as a whole.
Triangle J COG provides data to
municipalities that may have small staffs or
budgets so that all parts of the region can
achieve a basic level of land use and
transportation planning. Yet, membership in
Triangle J is not mandatory, and localities such as
Siler City and Wilson Mills are not represented.
Under its voluntary structure. Triangle J COG
can:
Mediate land use and transportation
disputes between localities:
Provide land use and transportation data
to all municipalities in the region:
Develop model ordinances for localities;
and
Establish regional land use and
transportation principles.
Finally, while COGs like Triangle J may
develop regional principles, they have no power
to implement their recommendations (Municipal
Cooperation Guide 1993). Therefore, their plans
are often "ignored almost at will by member local
governments" (Porter 1997). For a regional
agency to have true land use and transportation
power, it must be given statutory home rule
powers, there must be an express grant of
powers to the agency through a state
constitutional provision for regional governments,
or there must be specific state or federal
legislation that allows the consolidation of local
municipalities to form regional governments
(Richardson 2000).
Alternative Institutional Arrangements
The Research Triangle could improve
regional coordination of land use and
transportation development by adopting a
different structure of regional governance.
Experiences from other regions in the United
States provide examples of successful inter-
jurisdictional arrangements. Table 1 shows how
the effectiveness and feasibility of regional
initiatives could be affected or improved under
alternative arrangements to the present regional
government structure in the Triangle.
Table 1 describes six regional governance
structures that are currently used in regions of
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Table 1: Institutional Arrangements to Coordinate Land Use and Transportation Planning
Institutional
Arrangement
Potential to Improve Land Use and
Transportation Coordination
Description/Powers Effectiveness Feasibility Example! s)
Voluntary
Cooperative
Arrangement
Between Local
Governments
Regional councils of governments or
public/private regional organizations
that foster communication or settle
disputes between jurisdictions,
provide data and technical
expertise, and set regional goals
+/- +/-
Triangle J Council of
Governments (Triangle Region);
South Alabama Regional
Planning Commission; Bi-State
Regional Planning Commission;
Puget Sound Council of
Governments (a)
Mandatory
Membership in
Regional
Commission
Agency collects annual dues from all
municipalities in region to hold
regional public meetings or devebp
advisory regional plan
+ +
Atlanta Regional Commission
(b)
Single-Purpose
Regional Agency
Regional Public Service Authority or
Regional Environmental
Conservation Agency providing a
specific service to region, such as
air quality, sewer, airport, or transit
management often have
implementation power over specific
service
+/- +/-
Triangle Transit Authority
(Triangle Region); Bay Area
Air Quality Management
District; New Jersey Pinelands
Commission; San Francisco
Metropolitan Transportation
Commission (c)
Multidisciplinary
Agency with Joint
Mission of Land
Use and
Transportation
Coordination
Regional transportation agency w ith
land use personnel or developers on
stafE may have power over land use
development in transportation
corridors or near transit stations
+ +/-
Washington D.C. Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority (d)
Single Metropolitan
Planning
Organization
Agency mandated by federal
legislation to coordinate
transportation planning and allocate
federal and state transportation
funding throughout regions of over
200.000 residents
+ +/-
Durham-Chapel HiD-Carrboro
MPO or Capital Area MPO
(Triangle Region): MPOs in all
urban regions of the United
States (e)
Formal
Metropolitan or
Regional
Government
Single government body with
complete land use and
transportation planning, regulation
and implementation control over
entire region; officials may be
elected under state-granted Home
Rule power or appointed from
localities
++ -
Portland Metro Council; Twin
Cities Metropolitan Council (f)
Status Quo Institutional Arrangement=land use authority at local level; voluntary regional council of
governments; transportation authority split between two MPOs; one single-purpose transit agency
KEY: =major positive change from status quo for given criterion; ~=minor positive change from status quo for
given criterion; +/- =no improvement or mixed evaluation for given criterion; - =minor negative change from
status quo for given criterion; — =major negative change from status quo for given criterion
SOURCES:
(a) Porter 1992: Atkins 1993; MRSC 1993: Pincetl 1994: Porter 1994: GTRC 1997: Porter 1997; Rusk 2000
(b) GTRC 1997
(c) Lassar 1991; Easley 1992; Porter 1992: Atkins 1993: Chapralis 1994; Pincetl 1994; Baldassare, et al. 1996; Porter 1997
(d)TCRP 1998
(e) Atkins 1993; Pincetl 1994; Rusk 2000
(f) Atkins 1993: Rusk 2000
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the United States. The institutional
arrangements are not mutually exclusive. For
example, the Triangle region has a voluntary
cooperative agreement between local
governments, a single-purpose regional agency,
and two metropolitan planning organizations.
The rating of a regional institution's effectiveness
represents the positive or negative change, in
comparison to the Triangle's current structure of
governance, with respect to the extent to which
the region is able to achieve coordination of land
use and transportation by using regional
development tools. The rating of a regional
institution's feasibility represents the positive or
negative change, in comparison to the Triangle's
current structure of governance, with respect to
the degree of difficulty that the institution will
have implementing land use and transportation
decisions from a political, legal and technical
perspective. The institutional arrangement
ratings are not taken from the perspective of any
ofthe Triangle's regional organizations, local
governments or business or environmental
interests; they are based on evidence that is
presented throughout the paper on the success or
failure of these institutions in other regions of the
United States.
Evaluation of Institutional Arrangements
Currently, the Triangle Region has a
voluntary cooperative arrangement between
local governments (Triangle J COG), a single-
purpose regional agency (TTA). and two
separate MPOs. CAMPO and DCHC MPO.
The effectiveness and feasibility of regional
coordination of land use and transportation may
be improved if one or several of the alternative
institutional arrangements are adopted.
Implementing a more comprehensive regional
strategy may be the best way to coordinate land
use and transportation development in the
Triangle.
Effectiveness and Feasibility
As stated earlier, the effectiveness of an
institutional arrangement is based on the degree
to which the region's governing powers can be
used to coordinate land use and transportation
development. Several agencies in the Triangle
have stated missions to coordinate land use.
transportation or both across the region;
however, land use planning power is currently
held by individual local and county jurisdictions
within the Triangle region. Therefore, an
alternative institutional structure could be more
effective for coordinating land use and
transportation systems.
Based solely on effectiveness, creating a
government agency that would cover a large
geographic area would appear to be an easy
solution to improve coordination of land use and
transportation development in the Triangle
region. Empirically, however, the feasibility of
inter-governmental arrangements tends to
decrease as the size of their jurisdictions
increases. Land use control is a "'ferociously
jealously guarded local power" ( Pincetl 1 994).
Resistance to regional government comes both
from public policy and public sentiment.
There tends to be political support in the
Triangle for the status quo regional institutions.
Moreover, councils ofgovernments like Triangle
J are found in every state and are even needed
to qualify for some state and federal funds, many
regional agencies like TTA are created to
provide public transit service, and MPOs are
mandated federally. Therefore, adopting a new
land use and transportation policy-setting
structure in the Triangle would alter institutions
that are both familiar to residents of the region
and used commonly throughout the nation.
Two main legal obstacles affect the
feasibility of regional governance to coordinate
land use and transportation planning: 1 ) most
state enabling legislation causes land use
planning to be executed at the local government
level, while its impact on transportation corridors
and infrastructure extend across local
boundaries; and 2) federal legislation (i.e.
Transportation Equity Act for the 2
1
il Century -
TEA-2 1 ) mandates that transportation planning
be executed at the regional government level, yet
regional Metropolitan Planning Organizations do
not have the legal power to control land use.
Recommendations
Though each of the following
recommendations could be adopted separately, a
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comprehensive regional strategy may be the
most beneficial for the Triangle region. For
example, a regional sales tax may be most
effective and feasible if it is administered by a
council ofgovernments that all local
governments participate in and which has the
power to require that local land use and
transportation decisions are consistent with a
regional plan.
1. Require Mandatory Membership in the
Triangle J Council of Governments.
The North Carolina General Assembly could
enact a bill requiring that all localities become
members of their COGs. Each municipality
would be charged an annual fee based on its
number of residents. This would provide more
resources to Triangle J and also ensure local
representation on the council and give all
localities and counties in the Triangle a greater
stake in the plans and recommendations of the
regional agency. The Atlanta Regional
Commission (ARC) utilized mandatory
membership and a per capita annual fee to
successfully develop an advisory regional plan
(GTRC 1997). ARC used the annual $0.80 per
capita fee to hold public meetings and gather
input from citizens to develop the plan. Local
planners credited ARC with improv ing
communication among localities and discouraging
development with adverse regional impacts
(GTRC 1997). In the Triangle, fee revenue
could be used to hire more staff, collect and
provide additional data, and facilitate disputes
between municipalities. Though mandatory
membership and an annual fee still would not
allow the cooperative agency to implement and
enforce land use and transportation decisions, it
may provide a greater incentive for localities to
pay attention to the land use and transportation
guidelines provided by Triangle J. Also, because
mandator} participation and annual fee
requirements must be mandated by state
legislation, this act would send a powerful
message to local governments about the
importance of regional coordination.
2. Establish a Land Use Division in the
Triangle Transit Authority that has power
over land use decisions in transit corridors
and station areas.
In anticipation of its Regional Rail Initiative.
TTA could follow the model of the Washington
D.C. Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WAMTA) by establishing a land use division
w ithin the agency. Under this arrangement, TTA
could ensure that land uses within transit
corridors and near transit stations are transit-
supportive. Specifically, by working with local
officials, the agency could encourage higher
density and a better mix of land uses to support
ridership on the regional system. Further, official
corridor and station land use plans could be
created by TTA. or localities could be required to
comply with TTA land use guidelines. These
changes would improve the overall success of
transit in the Triangle region.
WAMTAs land use division develops
advisory land use plans for transit corridors and
areas near transit stations. Although WAMTA
could not establish zoning regulations, itsjoint
land use-development division worked closely
with local jurisdictions to foster appropriate rail
station area development patterns when planning
the Washington regional rail system (TCRP
1 998 ). A similar arrangement could work in the
Triangle region. Ideally, individual localities
would give up some local control over land use
around rail stations so that TTA could establish
mixed use zoning in transit station areas and
corridors and mandate local consistency with
station area development guidelines. However,
even if TTA's land use power was limited, or if
another regional governmental agency was
granted land use authority, a land use division
could advocate for a mix of land uses and
moderate to high residential and commercial
densities developed near stations in Durham.
RTP. Morrisville. Cary. and Raleigh. These land
uses would help support high ridership levels
when trains begin to run in 2007. Unfortunately,
there would most likely be strong political
resistance to TTA having all transit corridor and
station area land use authority.
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3. Merge the Raleigh and Durham MPOs.
With the support of local municipalities, the
two MPOs could be consolidated into one
agency that would coordinate transportation
planning and programming for the entire region.
Under a consolidated MPO. all municipalities
within the Triangle would be able to work with a
single organization towards a single regional
vision. Ideally, this would result in the funding of
projects that extend beyond current jurisdictional
boundaries to the region as a whole, such as
transit connections between Raleigh and
Durham.
The Bi-State Regional Planning Commission
operating in the Quad Cities region has
jurisdiction over four distinct cities, Davenport,
IA. Bettendorf, IA, Rock Island. IL, and Moline.
IL. The commission transcends municipal,
federal and geographic boundaries to serve
communities on both sides of the Mississippi
River. Like these residents of Iowa and Illinois,
who make a large number of trips among the
Quad Cities, residents ofChapel Hill and
Durham make a large number of commuting and
social trips to Cary and Raleigh and vice versa.
Therefore, a single MPO arrangement might also
be effective in the Triangle.
Combining the two MPOs is legally feasible
because the state legislature has already passed
a law to allow the Durham and Raleigh planning
organizations to merge. CAMPO. however,
opposed the merger ( The Chapel Hill News, II
1 2/00). possibly out ofconcern that local
interests would not be represented by a larger
agency. For example. Chapel Hill may have less
power to receive funding for sidewalk
improvements and its system of bikeways if the
MPO must also address the needs of towns like
Cary and Smithfield.
4. Give the Triangle J Council of
Governments authority over land use and
transportation development.
If the state legislature and the governor are
persuaded by the North Carolina Smart Growth
Commission to enact legislation that would
require or allow the formation of regional
agencies. Triangle J COG could obtain authority
over land use and transportation development.
The agency would be able to create a smart
growth plan and require that localities comply
with its land use and transportation development
provisions or develop a negotiated process of
cross-acceptance (Godschalk 2000). With this
structure in place. Triangle J would receive
incentives for creating plans, and localities in the
region could levy impact fees on new
developments, set up tax increment financing
districts, or establish transfer ofdevelopment
rights programs.
Modeled after the Portland Metro Council
and Twin Cities (Minneapolis-St. Paul)
Metropolitan Council, this type of regional body
(with supporting state legislation) could
coordinate its regional land use plans with the
regional transportation system and in effect
oversee the Durham and Raleigh MPOs and
TTA. The agency would not only be able to
achieve the land use and transportation
coordination goals lobbied for by the Greater
Triangle Regional Council, it could also:
Establish a regional tax or mandate
regional cost-sharing;
Adopt regional zoning ordinances to
establish minimum and maximum
development density, mixed land uses,
and transit-oriented or traditional
neighborhoods;
Write subdivision and transit-oriented
development regulations to require
facilities for walking and bicycling;
Acquire land for public buildings and
public right-of-way;
Review developments of regional impact
and plan and site regional public facilities;
Establish an urban growth boundary; and
Levy bonds to provide infrastructure in
transit corridors or provide tax incentives
for businesses to locate near transit
corridors or hubs.
The Twin Cities Metro Council mandated
that the plans of all 189 cities and towns in the
region be consistent with its regional systems
plans (Lassar 1991 ). As a result, it has been
credited with guiding 93 percent of development
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in the region between 1 980 and 1 990 to areas
designated in its comprehensive plan, saving $1
billion in infrastructure costs (GTRC 1997).
Portland used its regional zoning authority to set
minimum density targets of four to ten dwelling
units per acre for all 27 of its municipalities
(Porter 1 997). Similarly, King County, WA
proposed a measure that would require a
minimum of 1 5.000 jobs to be contained within
one-half mile of 14 high-density urban centers in
order to support its transit system. Opposition
surfaced, however, when projections showed
that the transit system would reduce traffic by
only two percent (Porter 1994).
Regional authority over land use decisions
would most likely come from the state
legislature. As shown by the success of the
agencies in Portland and the Twin Cities, regional
cooperation mandated by state statute may be
the most legally and politically feasible way to
create an effective growth management program
(Porter 1997; Rusk 2000). Though
municipalities may resent this top-down
approach, a statutory mandate could help counter
opposition from local proponents ofhome rule
authority. Thirteen states, including Florida,
Georgia and Tennessee, have statewide growth
management laws that integrate transportation
and land use planning and development
(Godschalk 2000). Recommendations of the
Smart Growth Commission may persuade
Raleigh lawmakers to enact legislation that
would allow a regional coordinating body with
similar powers to be created in the Triangle.
In California, the Joint Exercise of Powers
Act (California Government Code Section 6500-
6599. 1 ) allows two or more public agencies to
"jointly exercise any power common to the
contracting parties." The legislation permits the
creation of new government entities and can give
regional agencies powers such as the authority to
issue revenue bonds to pay for streets, roads,
bridges, or mass transit facilities and vehicles
(Carlson and King 1998). A similar act of the
North Carolina General Assembly could provide
these development management tools to a
regional government in the Triangle.
Formal regional governance powers are
more difficult to establish. Local officials may
not be willing to cede a regional group control
over decisions that could keep them from
implementing some of their own plans. For
example, though the review of developments of
regional impact (DRI) is required in the Twin
Cities and Atlanta, local governments resisted
DRI review in Palm Beach County. FL, leading
to the demise of the Palm Beach Countywide
Regional Council (Porter 1997). When regional
governance was proposed in San Francisco,
some anti-growth groups perceived that regional
authority w ould undermine their grassroots
support. At the same time, proponents of growth
thought that taking power away from local
governments would reduce the number of sites
open for development within the region (Porter
1997). Even within the area covered by the
successful Twin Cities Metro Council. 90 percent
of localities were opposed to the idea of regional
governance when it was first proposed.
Other political obstacles to establishing
governments that cover wide geographic areas
include the fact that suburban voters traditionally
oppose regional governments, as well as federal
funding cuts to regional agencies in the early
1980s. Regional governments" power to use land
use and transportation management tools may
also be impeded by the political climate. For
example, municipalities in the Twin Cities region
may begin to lobby against tax-sharing if they
see excessive revenue losses. And although
Portland Metro's home rule powers include
taxing authority, the agency has not used the
power to date because of the negative public
attitude toward taxes (Steele 2000). Opposition
to regional authority is found in the Triangle as
well. Steve Ford, staff writer for The Raleigh
News and Observer, commented. "Our counties,
and in some cases towns within those counties,
are still too competitive and jealous of local
prerogatives to agree to cede real power to a
regional body" (Ford 1999). Regional bodies are
perceived by residents and localities to have a
more difficult time providing information to. and
addressing the concerns of. individual citizens
than local governments (Pincetl 1994; Porter
1997).
Yet, when development and infrastructure
are planned poorly and the public perceives a
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crisis, regional governance becomes more
politically feasible. Environmental protection and
local growth regulation are now high-profile
issues in metropolitan areas. Because of traffic
congestion, automobile pollution, and a projected
$10 billion funding shortfall for new freeways,
secondary roads, mass transit, high occupancy
vehicle lanes, and pedestrian and bicycle
facilities over the next 25 to 50 years (Stradling
2000). many Triangle residents and business
leaders, as well as the mayors of Cary. Chapel
Hill and Durham, support a regional tax for
transportation improvements. Though a majority
of the members of the Raleigh Chamber of
Commerce do not support increased taxes, the
leaders of the Chamber would support new local
taxes that could help relieve traffic (Stradling
2000). Precedent for regional taxation in the
Triangle was set when TTA established a five
percent tax on car rentals in Durham, Orange
and Wake Counties in 1 997 that generates $6
million per year. A regional sales tax would
allow greater funding of a coordinated, region-
wide transportation system (Hyman 2000).
Several other programs have overcome
business and citizen concerns. In the New
Jersey Pinelands. a transfer of development
rights program administered by a regional
government has been successful in protecting
environmentally sensitive lands while focusing
higher-density development in areas with high
transportation accessibility (Porter 1997). The
Atlanta Regional Commission and Twin Cities
Metropolitan Planning Commission use their
power to review DRIs to ensure that local
projects do not have an adverse impact on the
region as a whole (GTRC 1997). Though the
public and developers in these regions worried
that the development process would be hindered
by additional reviews, the new Commission's
existence seems to be an effective incentive for
developers to think regionally. To date, no
projects have been delayed in the Twin Cities
(Lassar 1991).
Portland has successfully adopted
subdiv ision guidelines requiring pedestrian and
bicycle facilities and the establishment of
minimum standards for transportation
performance throughout the region (Porter
1 997). Finally, the New Jersey Pinelands and
Twin Cities have both been able to create tax
incentives for businesses to locate near transit
hubs (GTRC 1997; Porter 1997). These are
some of the tools that would be possible under a
regional framework in the Triangle.
5. Levy Regional Sales Tax to be
Administered by Triangle J Council of
Governments.
If TTA and the two MPOs were contained
within Triangle J. the agency could be given the
authority to administer a regional sales tax. The
Regional Transportation Alliance, a group of
business and government leaders organized by
the Greater Raleigh Chamber of Commerce, and
the mayors of Cary, Chapel Hill and Durham will
lobby the state legislature in January 2001 to
allow the region to vote on this type of tax. A
regional sales tax could help fund transit planning
and improvements, such as TTA*s Regional Rail
Initiative, station area plans, bus shelters, and
land acquisition in transit corridors. It could also
provide funding for highway, sidewalk and
bicycle system construction and maintenance
throughout the Triangle region.
The RTA has also given its support to
GTRC*s efforts to establish a regional land use
strategy and transportation initiatives. Policies
backed by the RTA include merging the Durham
and Raleigh MPOs. implementing TTVs
Regional Rail Initiative, and encouraging the
state to allow the region and localities to increase
transit funding through a regional 5-cent gas tax
or local sales tax. According to the Institute for
Transportation Research and Education at North
Carolina State University, sales taxes could raise
$65 million annually for the region (Paik 1999).
The local sales tax initiative follows the
model of Charlotte/Mecklenburg County, where
legislation allowed the region's voters to approve
a sales tax that raises $1 million per week for
mass transit (Hyman 2000). A regional body
with taxing authority in the Triangle would
provide the region with more transit funding than
is currently available for the entire state (the
legislature has capped NC DOT statewide
transit funding at $5 million annually). The tax
would also allow residents ofChapel Hill and
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Cary to help pay for roads that they use when
visiting Durham and Raleigh.
Yet. the feasibility of taxation remains in
question. While leaders of the Raleigh Chamber
of Commerce support the 0.5 percent tax. they
have stopped promoting it aggressively because
only 37 percent of the Chamber's 5000 members
support the tax (Stradling 2000). The region may
look to the Twin Cities for an example of a
regional tax-sharing program. As a result of this
Metro Council initiative. 40 percent of the
commercial and industrial tax base of each
municipality goes to a regional pool of funds,
which helps subsidize infrastructure costs for
poorer municipalities. Without the tax-sharing
program, the per capita tax disparity would have
been 50:1; with tax-sharing, it was only 12:1
(GTRC 1997).
The mayors of Can. Chapel Hill and
Durham also support a region-wide, multi-modal
transportation plan. According to The Chapel
Hill News, "current planning activity is focused
either on a single part of the Triangle, the
separate Capitol and Durham-Chapel Hill
planning organizations, or on distinct modes of
transportation... Nowhere is there in place a
region-wide, multi-modal transportation plan.
That's what the mayors want" ( The Chapel Hill
News, 7/12/00).
Further Support for Regional Solutions
Public support for regional governments is
often easier to come by if the organization
created focuses on a concrete, narrow regional
goal, such as water quality protection, transit
provision, or park system management
(Belldassare. et al. 1996: Porter 1997). For
instance, many Triangle residents perceive that
traffic congestion and air pollution reduce the
quality of life and viability of businesses in the
region (Hicks 1995: Ford 1999: Dyer and
Feagans 2000). In 1993. columnist Neal Price
cited "longer commuting times, pockets of ugly
and mounting traffic congestion, and air pollution
high enough to trigger ozone alert days" as
negative results of the Triangle's fragmented
leadership (Warrick 1993). These problems
have helped build support for the recent regional
development management strategy proposals of
the GTRC. RTA. and the mayors of Cary.
Chapel Hill and Durham. Yet. further support for
regional cooperation may not be generated if
planners and policy-makers at Triangle J COG
TTA, the Durham and Raleigh MPOs, and local
and county governments do not connect what
Triangle residents consider critical issues to the
inefficient results of local land use authority and
regional transportation control.
Between 1950 and 1990. the urbanized
population of the Triangle grew less than 300
percent, while the total urbanized area grew by
900 percent ( Whisnant 2000). Connecting the
local land use decisions that have fostered this
lower-density, non-contiguous growth to the
regional problems of traffic congestion and
automobile pollution can help rally public support
for cooperative regional solutions. For example,
planners can present concrete data, such as the
number of extra automobile trips that are needed
for residents ofApex or Hillsborough living in
neighborhoods that are not served by public
transit or are not within walking distance of
commercial centers. In addition, planners can
provide information about how much work and
family time is lost to commuting when a
residence is located five, ten or twenty miles
from an employment center. They can also
explain how much additional carbon monoxide.
h\ drocarbon or ozone pollution is created by
these trips. Summing emissions increases,
additional commuting expenses, decreases in
transit ridership. losses of exercise, and time lost
over the entire region can be used as a powerful
example of the public costs generated by
uncoordinated transportation decisions.
Between 1 990 and 2020. the population of
the Triangle is projected to increase 76 percent,
from 700.000 to 1 .230.000 ( Eisenstadt and Hoar
1995). This growth will be accommodated more
efficiently if land use and transportation systems
are coordinated over the entire region. If a
regional body is dedicated specifically to address
issues of traffic congestion and automobile
pollution in the Triangle, it may build credibility
through small successes. With this credibility, it
may be able to obtain broader powers to
coordinate land use and transportation
development.
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Summary
Evidence from other parts of the country
reveals the strengths and weaknesses of multi-
jurisdictional cooperation and suggests keys to
success for regional coordination of land use and
transportation development. Evaluating the
effectiveness and feasibility of alternative
institutional frameworks in the Triangle region
demonstrates that land use and transportation
coordination could be improved by adopting
alternative government arrangements. This
paper recommends five specific institutional
changes in order to achieve regional gains: 1
)
merge the Raleigh and Durham MPOs; 2)
require mandatory membership in the Triangle J
Council of Governments; 3) establish a Land
Use Division within the Triangle Transit
Authority with power over land use decisions
near transit corridors and stations; 4) give the
Triangle J Council ofGovernments authority over
land use and transportation development; and 5)
levy a regional sales tax to be administered by
Triangle J COG.
Sandy Ogburn suggests that the Triangle has
made progress toward taking this kind of regional
view. The Triangle hosted a World Class Region
Conference in 1987. which eventually inspired
the creation ofTTA and GTRC. Within the past
five years, there has been renewed interest in
regional planning strategies. "Right now the
mayors are interested and the business
community is interested." says Ogburn. But
significant shifts in attitudes still must be made:
"Although the rest of the world views us as a
region, individually we do not view ourselves as a
region. Not working as a region impedes sitting
at the table and working through problems
together." Adopting an institutional structure that
fosters coordinated land use and transportation
systems at the regional level can ensure that the
quality of life in the Triangle region remains as
high as it was when Sandy Ogburn first moved
here 25 years ago.©
References
Atkins. PatriciaS. 1993. "From the Mauling to the
Mailing of Regionalism," Public Administration
Review, 53(6), November/December.
Baldassare. Mark. Joshua Hassol, William Hoffman,
and Abby Kanarek. 1996. "Possible Planning
Roles for Regional Government: A Survey ofCity
Planning Directors in California," Journal ofthe
American Planning Association. 62( 1 ), Winter.
Carlson, Daniel and Stephen King. 1998. Linking
Transportation and Land Use by Fostering Inter-
jurisdictional Cooperation: Enabling Legislation
in Eight States. Institute for Public Policy and
Management. Daniel J. Evans School of Public
Affairs, University of Washington, May.
The Chapel Hill News. 2000. "Regional Plan Needed
for Transportation," July 1 2, p. A4.
Chapralis, Sally. 1994. "On the Agenda for 21st-
century Chicago: Regionalism," Urban Land,
November.
City of Durham, NC. 2000. Durham Zoning
Ordinance. Online, Available December 3 at: http:/
/www.ci.durham.nc.us/planning/zoneord/
section5/index.html.
City of Raleigh, NC. 2000. Raleigh Zoning Code,
Online, Available Decembers at: http://
www.raleigh-nc.org/planning'planzs.htm
Diaz, David. 2000. Transportation Planner, South
Alabama Regional Planning Commission,
Interview, October 1 8.
D'Ignazio. Janet. 2000. "Growing Smart About
Transportation," Popular Government. Fall,
66( I ), pp. 52-56.
Dyer. Eric. 2000. "Growth's Effects Challenge
Stewards of Natural Resources," The Raleigh
News andObserver, March 29. p. A I
.
Easley, V. Gail. 1992. Staying Inside the Lines: Urban
Growth Boundaries, PAS #440, Chicago,
American Planning Association.
Eisenstadt. Steven and Steven Hoar. 1995. "A New
Line," The Raleigh News and Observer. January
8,p.Al.
Ford. Steve. 1999. "What it Takes for Cities to Slow
the " Dozers," The Raleigh News and Observer.
July l8.p.A24.
Greater Triangle Regional Council (GTRC). 1997.
"Regional Case Study Series: Minneapolis-St.
Paul. MN; Atlanta, GA; San Diego. CA; Portland,
OR," Regional Development Choices Project.
September.
Godschalk. David R. 2000. "Smart Growth Around
the Nation." Popular Government. Fall. 66( 1 ), pp.
12-20.
Hicks. Sally. 1995. "Triangle Dream Homes Create
Sprawling Nightmare." The Raleigh News and
Observer, July 3, p. A 1
.
Hitchings. Benjamin G. 1998. "A Typology of
Regional Growth Management Systems." The
Regionalist,3(\,2),Fa\\.
19
Hitchings, Benjamin G. 2000. Senior Planner. Triangle
J Council of Governments, Questionnaire
response, October 16.
Hyman, Vicki. 2000. "Mayors want Tax for Transit,"
The Raleigh News and Observer, July 7, p. B 1
.
Lassar. Terry J. 1 99 1 . "Sharing the Benefits and
Costs of Growth Management in Minneapolis."
Urban Land, February.
Leavenworth. Stuart. 1996. "More Roads will mean
More Pollution. Environmentalists Say," The
Raleigh News and Observer. October 3 I . p. A 1 6.
Leavenworth. Stuart. 1999. ""Developers, Activists
Craft Principles for Growth." The Raleigh News
and Observer, June 5.
Leo, Christopher, Mary Ann Beavis, Andrew Carver,
and Robyne Turner. 1998. "Is Urban Sprawl
Back on the Political Agenda?" Urban Affairs
Review, 34(2), November.
McLaughlin. Mike. 2000. Director of Land Use and
Public Facilities and Planning, San Diego
Association of Governments. Questionnaire
response. November 2.
Municipal Research Services Center of Washington
(MRSC). 1993. Municipal Cooperation Guide.
Report No. 27, September.
North Carolina Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Division ofAir Quality. 2000.
Ozone Forecast Center. Online. Available
November 1,2000: www.daq.state.nc.us.
Ogburn. Sandy. 2000. Associate Director. Triangle
Transit Authority. Interview. December 12, 10 a.m.
Paik. Angela. 1998. "The Threat of Sprawl." The
Raleigh News and Observer. September 1 0, p. B 1
.
Paik. Angela. 1999. "A Fix-it Plan for Triangle," The
Raleigh News and Observer, March 16, p. Al.
Pincetl. Stephanie. 1994. "The Regional Management
ofGrowth in California: A History of Failure,"
Cambridge, MA, Blackwell Publishing, pp. 256-
274.
Porter. Douglas R. 1992. "Tough Choices: Regional
Governance for San Francisco," Urban Land,
March.
Porter, Douglas R. 1994. "No Easy Answers in King
County, Washington," Urban Land, July.
Porter. Douglas R. 1997. Managing Growth in
America's Communities. Washington D.C.. Island
Press.
The Raleigh News and Observer. 2000. ""Leaders
Tack$10 Billion to Transit Costs." November 16.
Available November 16.2000:
www.newsandobserver.com.
Richardson, Craig. 2000. Legal Issues Relevant to
Development Management. Presentation to the
University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Department ofCity and Regional Planning,
Development Management Class (PLAN 244).
November 2.
Rusk. David. 2000. "Growth Management: The Core
Regional Issue." Reflections on Regionalism,
Edited by Bruce Katz. Washington, D.C..
Brookings Institution.
Steele. Beth Anne. 2000. Outreach Coordinator.
Portland Metro Council. Survey response,
October 12.
Stradling, Richard. 2000. "Chamber Puts Off Pushing
Tax, only gets 37 Percent Support." The Raleigh
News and Observer, December 8. Available
December 8. 2000: www.newsandobserver.com.
Town ofChapel Hill, NC. Chapel Hill Comprehensive
Plan, Online, Available December 3 at: http://
www.ci.chapel-hill.nc.us/planning
.
Transit Cooperative Research Program. 1998. Transit
and Urban Form. Vol. 2. Chapter 3, "Role of
Transit in Regional Planning," Parsons
BrinckerhoffQuade and Douglas.
Triangle Transit Authority. 1997. Station Area
Development Guidelines for the Regional Transit
Stations. December.
Vallem. Gary. 2000. Executive Director, Bi-State
(Illinois Iowa) Regional Commission,
Questionnaire Response. October 24.
Warrick, Joby. 1993. "Regional Council Seeking a
Voice." The Raleigh News and Observer, October
lO.p.Al.
Whisnant. Richard. 2000. ""Growing Pains: A Tale of
Two Cities and a Farm in Between." Popular
Government. Fall. 66( 1 ). pp. 2-11.
20
